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VALUATION OF PROPERTY PAID FOR STOCK: A REAPPRAISAL
J. LOUIS ADAMS*
The obligations of corporate shareholders extend in two directions: to
the corporation on the one hand, and to creditors of the corporation on the
other.
To the corporation the shareholders are bound to pay the full value of
their shares, either in money or money's worth. When the shareholder has-
once paid into the corporate treasury the full value of his shares, his liability,
for all practical purposes, ceases. Unless the articles of association to whicr
he has agreed provide for special levies or assessments the corporation has.
no further claim upon him. Nor may the state order a levy upon the share-
holders for the benefit of creditors or others unless it has reserved the right
to amend the corporate charter, or unless the statutory law, which is a part
of the charter, expressly provides for such assessment.1 Further, even if a
majority of the shareholders should, by means of a by-law, order an assess-
ment upon all the shareholders, the corporation would be powerless to compel
an unwilling shareholder to contribute.
To the creditors of the corporation shareholders are bound (a) for un-
paid stock subscriptions; (b) for watered or fictitiously paid up stock.
With respect to both corporate and creditor obligations of the shareholder
it is apparent that the question of paramount importance is whether or not
the shareholder has actually paid the full value of his shares. If he has done
so, neither the corporation nor its creditors have any valid basis for complaint.
What he and the other shareholders paid in constitutes the permanent capital
of the corporation. It is there for all to see. But the other shareholders and
the creditors may rely on the fact that the shareholder has paid in full for
his shares. If he has not done so, protection of the remaining shareholders
and creditors is unjustly diminished; the non-paying shareholder will be liable
to the extent that his shares have not been fully paid for.2 It is the purpose
*J. Louis Adams, long associated with the investment banking business, is now a
practicing member of the Tennessee Bar. Mr. Adams was the 1947 winner of the Bache
Prize in Corporate Finance.
I. See Drennen v. Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co., 115 Ala. 592, 23 So. 164 (1897)
Cullen v. Abbott, 201 Wis. 255, 229 N. W. 85 (1930).
2. Although it is not within the scope of this article to enter into any discussion of
the various theories upon which the non-paying shareholder is held liable, it should be
noted that the corporation has a remedy only when the shareholder has not fully paid
what he agreed to pay,. in which cise a creditor-debtor relationship exists between the
corporation and the non-paying shareholder; the debt represents a corporate asset. If,
however, the shareholder has paid all that he agreed to pay, and his shares are issued as
fully paid, the corporation has no redress against him even though his shares are not
fully paid in fact. But binding as this agreement is between the corporation and the
shareholder, it in no way affects the rights of a creditor. Four principal theories have
been advanced by the courts in allowing creditors to recover: fraud (creditor relied on
paid-in capital of corporation as represented); trust fund (unpaid share amounts con-
stitute a trust fund for creditors) ; joint debtor (shareholders are liable as joint debtors
26
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of this article to examine and reappraise the bases of valuation of property
given by the shareholder in exchange for his stock. Put another way, what
are the tests and criteria used by the courts in determining whether or not
full value has been paid for shares? Are these tests adequate and in line with
modern business trends?
II
MONEY
The judicial tests for the valuation of property paid for stock involve
a determination of the fair value and the (statutory) type of consideration.
It is obvious at the very outset that if the shareholder pays for his shares
in money no problem of valuation arises except that of simple arithmetical
computation; either he has paid in dollars the full value of the shares or he
has not. Indeed, some early American statutes expressly provided for share
payment in money; and courts, in construing those statutes, held inadequate
the payment to the corporation of any other consideration, even though that
other consideration was the equivalent of the full money value of the shares.3
Gradually, however, it became apparent that such requirements were
impractical. 4 Today nearly every jurisdiction has express statutory provisions
permitting the issuance of stock for consideration other than money.5 Im-
mediate dangers were apparent, however, in the form of stock watering, for
as soon as considerations other than money were permitted there arose the
ever-present chance that the other considerations might be overvalued and
not representative of the full share value. It is only natural, then, that these
other-than-money statutes have been tempered with caution.
III
LABOR DONF
New York Stock Corporation Law § 69 is typical of the majority of
state statutes in providing that, "No corporation shall issue either shares of
for payment of full value of shares) ; statutory obligation (statutes permitting incorpora-
tion carry with them an obligation to make full payment for shares). See Wood v. Dum-
mer, 3 Mason 308, 311 (U. S. 1824) ; Scovill v. Thayer, 105 U. S. 143 (1881) ; Camden
v. Stuart, 144 U. S. 104 (1892) ; Forcum v. Symmes, 106 Fla. 510, 143 So. 630 (1932) ;
Hospes v. North Western Mfg. & Car Co., 48 Minn. 174, 50 N. W. 1117 (1892) ; DuPont
v. Ball, 11 Del. Ch. 430, 106 Atl. 39 (1918).
3. Maine v. Butler, 130 Mass. 196 (1881); McDaniel v. Harvey, 51 Mo. App. 198
(1892) ; People v. Troy House Co., 44 Barb (N. Y.) 625 (1865) Lee v. Cutrer, 96
Miss. 355, 51 So. 808 (1910).
4. "Corporations must own property for the purposes of their legitimate business,
and it would be a useless formality to receive money in payment for the stock and return
it again in payment for the property." Garrett v. Kansas City Coal Mining Co., 113 Mo.
330, 20 S. W. 965 (1892).
5. For a collection of constitutional and statutory provisions see 4 FLETCHER, CYc.
or CORPS. §§ 5209-5214.
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stock or bonds, except for money, labor done or property actually received for
the use and lawful purposes of such corporation. . . ,' 6 Judicial controversies
involving this common type of statute have, in large part, been concerned
with the valuation of promotional services. Before the court can proceed to
any actual valuation, however, the question must first be answered, What
constitutes "money, labor done or property actually received"? Would services
performed in organizing the corporate enterprise amount to "labor done"
or "property actually received"? Most courts were quick to answer in the
negative. In an early leading case7 the New York court said: "The statute
requires that stock shall be paid for either by cash or property. Services
rendered in bringing a corporation into existence is neither cash nor property.
If it were, then the entire capital stock could thus be disposed of, and the
only asset which the corporation would have would be its naked existence."
And in Ludlam v. Riverhead Bond & Mortgage Corp.,8 another New York
court, thirty-five years later, repeated, "Neither the stock nor the property
of a corporation may be issued or paid out to a promoter for his services in
organizing the corporation." 9
Suppose, however, that the promoter is allotted shares not for bringing
the corporation into existence but for remaining with the enterprise after it
has reached the going concern stage. The court was faced with such a problem
in Wellington Bull & Co., Inc., v. Morris.'0 The corporation in that case was
formed pursuant to Morris' idea to organize Morris Plan banks. The de-
fendant, Morris, was essential to the continued life of the enterprise, at least
both in the unanimous opinion of the directors, who approved the stock al-
lotment under attack, and in the unanimous ratification of the allotment plan
by the stockholders. In holding for the defendant the court failed to discuss
the "money, labor done or property actually received" requirement of the
statute, basing its decision instead upon lack of bad faith, clear oppression
or breach of trust by the directors coupled with unanimous proxy ratification
by the shareholders, of whom the plaintiff was one. In the Morris case, then,
there was an independent board of directors and full disclosure of all the
facts to the shareholders. But important as those factors are, should a de-
fendant in a Morris-type situation be allowed to retain his added share
compensation in the. face of statutes such as New York Stock Corporation
6. Even if the state statute does not contain the exact wording of the New York
statute ("money, labor done or property actually received") judicial decision has re-
quired payment to be in those forms prior to reaching the actual process of evaluating
what was given by the shareholder in exchange for his shares.
7. Herbert v. Duryea, 34 App. Div. 478, 54 N. Y. Supp. 311 (1898), aff'd, 164 N. Y.
596, 58 N. E. 1088 (1900).
8. 248 App. Div. 908, 290 N. Y. Supp. 648 (1936).
9. Accord, Kirkup v. Anaconda Amusement Co., 59 Montana 469, 197 Pac. 1005
(1921); Stevens v. Episcopal Church History Co., 140 App. Div. 570, 125 N. Y. Supp.
573 (1910) ; Winston v. Saugerties Farms, Inc., 21 N.. Y. S. 2d 841 (1940). But see
Bryan v. Northwest Beverages, Inc., 69 N. D. 274, 285 N. W. 689 (1939).
10. 132 Misc. 509, 230 N. Y. Supp. 122 (1928).
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Law § 69? It is no answer to say that the shareholders "ratified" the stock
allotment plan if it is otherwise violative of the statute, for an illegal act
cannot be ratified. Nor had Morris given any money or property or done any
labor in the usual sense of those terms. Indeed, the court pointed out that,
"Nor can it be said that the extra compensation was for past services."
(Italics added) It cannot be forgotten, however, that Morris was part and
parcel of the enterprise. With his continued services the venture might suc-
ceed; without him the plan was practically assured of failure. Could it not
be argued in a common sense vein, then, that the agreement under which the
directors induced Morris to remain with the organization amounted to "prop-
erty actually received"? The conclusion seems inescapable that Morris' con-
tinued services were as much, if not more, of an asset to the corporation than
physical equipment such as a plant or machinery. It is submitted that the
courts do not wish to strike down such an arrangement merely because the
requirements of the "money, labor done or property actually received" por-
tions of the statute are not technically fulfilled. The danger in non-fulfillment
lies in overvaluation and consequent harm to shareholders and creditors,
not in honest evaluation of an asset."
IV
PROPERTY ACTUALLY RECEIVED
Faced with the statutory requirements of "money, labor done or property
actually received" (or statutory words of similar import), and having been
able to contribute neither of the first two, the promoter., incorporator, or other
person connected with the organization who receives compensation in the
form of stock, may turn to the third of these alternatives, "property actually
received." If the property donated by him is tangible in character, the further
problem of whether its value is equal to the value of the shares received by
him remains, Similarly, only the problem of valuation remains if the donated
property is intangible, as in the Morris case. 12 This problem of actual valua-
tion will be discussed presently. Again, however, before the computation of
value stage is reached the courts may often be called upon io decide whether
a particular donation is property, just as they. are called upon to decide what
is and what is not "labor done."
A common method of attempted compliance with the "property actually
received" requirement of the statute is that of payment by promissory note.
11. As has been previously indicated, when the statute requires "labor done," labor
to be done would not be a proper basis on which. to allot additional share compensation.
The case of Morgan v. Bon Bon, 222'N. Y. 22, 118 N. E. 205 (1917), however, suggests
a method of compensation not violative of the statute: framing the contract to stipulate
that the labor to be done (services to be performed) shall be paid for when performed.
12. See note 10 supra.
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Is the donation of a promissory note either "money" or "property actually
received" ?
First, it is clear that unless the statute or charter expressly prohibits the
taking of promissory notes as payment for stock 13 the corporation may do
so. Whether the delivery of the note constitutes payment, however, is another
matter. It has been successfully argued in several jurisdictions that a promis-
sory note is no more than a promise to pay14 and that payment of the note,
not its delivery to the corporation, constitutes payment for shares. The seem-
ing weight of this argument disappears somewhat when the note is secured,
for, in effect, the corporation, on delivery of the note itself, now has an
investment of definite worth. 15
The giving of a check has been uniformly regarded as the equivalent of
either "money" or "property actually received." 16
V
THE VALUATION PROCESS
Assuming that the foregoing statutory requirements have been fulfilled.
that is, that what was given by the person who received the stock constituted
either "money, labor done or property actually received," the problem re-
mains of determining whether what was given in exchange for the stock was
equivalent in value to the shares received.
There now is raised the all-important question of what method the courts
should use in solving the problem of fair valuation. Examination of judicial
pronouncements on the subject reveals that two different tests have been
employed: the "true value" rule and the "good faith" rule.
(a) trite value rule
If the court uses the true value rule in arriving at a determination of
whether what was given in a medium other than money as payment for the
shares, theoretically nothing but the actual value in fact is taken into account.
Suppose, for example, that a new refrigerator, just out of the showroom,
was given in exchange for shares. Suppose further that the retail price of
this refrigerator was $400, not just in one store but all over the country. The
13. See Ono GF. CoDE § 8622 (Throckmorton, 1930); Union Central Life Ins.
Co. v. Curtis, 35 Ohio St. 343 (1880).
14. For an exhaustive collection of authorities see 11 FLETcHiER, Cvc. OF COat'S.
§§ 5194-5195.
15. See The Southern Life Insurance & Trust Co. v. Ianier, 5 Fla. 110, 58 Am.
Dec. 448 (1853); Pacific Trust Co. v. Dorsey, 72 Cal. 55, 12 Pac. 49 (1886).
16. Furlong v. Johnston, 209 App. Div. 198, 204 N. Y. Supp. 710 (1924). But if
the check is given with intent to defraud, n1o such rule obtains. Furlong v. Johnston,
supra. It should also be noted here that courts allow issuance of stock in exchange for
patents, trademarks, and stock of other co-porations (where the issuing corporation has
such power). See ii FL..TCH R, CYC. oF CosS. §§ 5189-5192.
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"true value" of that refrigerator would be placed at $400. But suppose that
the directors who issued the shares honestly believed it to be worth $450 and
exchanged shares on that basis; assume that they were acting in the utmost
good faith but made an honest error. Under the true value rule the share-
holder would be liable to creditors in an assessment action for $50.
Such a result might seem perfectly fair, and such indeed might be the
case if the thing given in exchange for stock were always so easily evaluated.
All that the plaintiff would have to show would be the true value "in fact"
of the thing given; no other elements would enter the situation. But the
fallacy in such a proposition lies in the fact that the hypothetical refrigerator
case just posed is the exception, not the rule. Suppose again that what is
given in exchange for shares is jewelry. Suppose further that the directors,
again acting with the highest degree of good faith, put a value of $1000 on
the jewelry.- If the court should later decide that the true value in fact of
the jewelry was $800, the shareholder would be liable for the difference. In
the jewelry case, and even in the refrigerator case, the matter of value was
not one of fact but of opinion. True, the refrigerator had a price tag of $400
placed on it. But in the last analysis this price represented only the collective
buyers' opinion of its worth. Although it would be difficult to see how opinions
could differ as to the price of the refrigerator if an investigation had been
made, it is equally difficult to see how they might not differ in the usual
case. 17 It is submitted that the words "true value" are misleading. What is
true value to you may be false value to me. More than that, the shareholder
can seldom be secure in the knowledge that he has fully paid for his shares
whenever his payment is in a medium other than money. His innocence, the
innocence and good faith of the directors, or even of those persons who were
employed by the directors as appraisers of his property-all these factors
mean nothing, for the valuation is constantly open to judicial scrutiny and
possible upset with resulting penalty to the shareholder.
It seems appropriate to ask at this point what good purpose is served
by subscribing to the true value rule. Does not the rule, starting from the
false premise that value is a matter of fact and not opinion, place an artificial
premium on prevention of overvaluation of property and at too much of a
risk to the shareholder, especially when adequate protection can be achieved
through other equally effective and more realistic tests? Certain it is that
legislatures enacted corporation statutes for the avowed purpose of encour-
aging the formation of corporate epterl)rises. But it is difficult to see how
strict application of the true value rule would in any way promote this pur-
pose; rather it would appear to defeat it.
17. See Schenck v. Andrews, 57 N. Y. 133 (1874).
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(b) good faith rfle
The chief difference between the true value rule and the good faith rule
is that the latter recognizes that value is a matter of opinion, not fact. If the
property in question is valued in good faith, the shareholder is relieved from
liability, even though the actual value of the property is shown to be less
than that placed upon it by the appraisers.'
There is a division of authority among courts adopting the good faith
rule as to what constitutes lack of good faith. It is clear everywhere that honest
mistakes of judgment do not spell lack of good faith, 9 even where the prop-
erty was in fact greatly overvalued. 20 A conflict of authority exists, however,
on whether actual fraud is necessary for a showing of bad faith,2' or whether
intentional overvaluation is sufficient. Put another way, in the absence of
actual fraud, is the judgment of the directors as to the value of the property
conclusive? Or will the courts go behind the transaction if apparent bad faith
though not "actual fraud" exists? In insisting on the presence of "actual
fraud" before the transaction can be inspected, it is submitted that courts are
taking an unrealistic view of the matter. Either the term "actual fraud" should
be looked upon as including wilful overvaluation in bad faith or the judgment
of the directors should be deemed conclusive only when the plaintiff fails to
show had faith on their part. In short, either the directors have conscien-
tiously attempted to value the property and have used ordinary business judg-
ment in arriving at the valuation or they have not. If they have: then the
court should hold in their favor; if they have not, judgment should be to the
contrary.22
18. Typical statutes provide that, "... any corporation may purchase any property
authorized by its certificate of incorporation, and may issue stock to the amount of the
value in payment therefor . . . and in the absence of fraud in the transaction thejudgment of the directors shall be conclusive. See N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 69;
FLA. CoMp. GFT. LAWS § 6537 (1927).
19. In re Charles Town Light & Power Co., 199 Fed. 846 (1912); Hastings Malting
Co. v. Iron Range Brewing Co., 65 Minn. 28, 67 N. W. 652 (1896).
20. Young v. Erie Iron Co., 65 Mich. 11i, 31 N. W. 814 (1887).
21. For a collection of cases holding that there must be actual fraud see 11 FLErCHE.R,
CYC. oi CORPS. § 5214.
22. In an excellent book by Dodd, STOCK WATERING, Ti-sr JUI;TcIAL VALUATION OF
PROPERTY FOR STOCK ISSUP, PURPOSES (1930), the author would ignore the distinction
between the true value and good faith rules and would base his conclusion instead on1
whether the directors exercised ordinary business judgment in their appraisal.
"The conclusion (drawn) . . . from . . . (the) review of the several 'good
faith' rules as opposed to one another and to the 'true value' rule is that the dis-
tinctions are largely verbal. . . .There is little or no ground for making a practical
distinction between the operation of the several rules, because the question in any
case resolves itself into a query as to what was a reasonable valuationu of the property
as made by the directors in the exercise of ordinary business judgment .... In effect,
the standard of conduct for which all of the courts hold directors and shareholders
responsible is that of ordinary business prudence. ... Doo, supra 92-93.
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(c) future earning power as an element of value
One of the most difficult problems entering the process of valuation
concerns the propriety of considering future earnings or profits as elements
of value of the property turned over to the corporation in exchange for stock.
Suppose that the X street car company wants to purchase the Y street car
company, operating exclusive lines in adjacent territory. The agreement con-
templates exchange of X company stock for the Y company franchise and
physical equipment. Now, what elements should enter into the valuation of the
property being turned over to the X company? Should the court consider
the reproduction cost of the Y company property alone, or should future earn-
ings (prospective profits) of the Y company property also be considered as an
element of value?
A leading New Jersey case23 adopted the view that the property ex-
changed for stock should have a definitely ascertainable value, not merely a
speculative value. Accordingly the court held that property should be capi-
talized at its reproduction value, that future earning power was not a proper
element to consider in valuation. Under a governing statute providing that,
"The directors of any' company incorporated under this act may purchase
mines, manufactories or other property necessary for their business," 24 the
court emphasized that the word "property" referred only to "something
visible and tangible." 25
In the New Jersey case just referred to, however, the enterprise was a
new one, with no record of post earnings. In fact, an examination of the deci-
sions holding that contemplated profits are not properly an element of value 26
reveals that the enterprise (property) in question was new and speculative.27
It is the writer's belief that in determining whether prospective profits are
proper elements of value, the courts actually look to past earnings of the
enterprise and then base their decision on what future earnings, if any, would
probably develop. It is much less difficult to predict future profits on the basis
of the earnings picture of the property in past years than to predict when the
enterprise is new and totally lacking in any earning experience.
It is submitted, however, that even where the property has a past earn-
23. See v. Heppenheimer, 69 N. J. Eq. 36, 61 Atil. 843 (1905).
24. This N. J. statute was subsequently amended to read: "no stock shall be issued
for profits not yet earned, but only anticipated." See Bryson v. Conlen, 104 N. J. Eq.
180, 144 Ad. 723 (1929).
25. Accord, Hodgmain v. Atlantic Refining Co., 2 F. 2d 893 (D. C. Del. 1924) ; Wal-
lace v. Weinstein, 257 Fed. 625 (C. C. A. 3d 1919) ; Scully v. Automobile Finance Co., 11
Del. Ch. 355, 101 Aft. 908 (1917) ; Holcombe v. Trenton White City Co., 80 N. J. Eq,
122, 82 Atl. 618 (1912) ; Donald v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 621 N. J. Eq.
729, 48 Ati. 771 (1901).
26. See cases cited note 25 srrpro.
27. But see Gamble v. Queens County Water Co., 123 N. Y. 91, 25 N. E. 201
(1890), where the New York court recognized the valuation of future earnings, taking
into consideration the prevention of competition and the saving of business losses.
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ings record, predictions as to future profits constitute little more than a
guessing game. Conditions, financial or otherwise, may, and often do, change
suddenly. At best, future earning power is an uncertain element to take into
consideration when evaluating the property to be exchanged for stock.
CoNci.usioN
Nearly all statutory requirements with regard to that which is given in
exchange for stock issued by the corporation are lacking in creditor and in-
vestor protection in that they fail to define adequately "money, labor done
or property actually received." This lack of adequate definition has forced the
courts to give strained, and often unavoidably unjust, interpretations when
faced with concrete problems of exchange. But courts in general have ap-
proached these problems with a realistic attitude. The continued services of a
promoter may be of greater value to the enterprise than a building or ma-
chinery; a promissory note may well be the equivalent of cash. This practical
judicial approach, however, is not because of statutory draftsmanship but in
spite of it. Revision on a national scale is in order.
The current "true value" and "good faith" rules are inadequate, both in
approach and application, to the actual valuation process. The true value rule,
based on the false assumption that value is a matter of fact rather than
opinion, was artificially conceived and is artificially applied. The good faith
rule, fairer in application, still fails for want of definition of the term "good
faith." A rule requiring in all cases ordinarybusiness prudence and judg-
ment seems much more suited to modern business practices and trends.
In these troublous times if the free enterprise system as we know it is to
flourish as it has in the past, investors and lenders of capital must have as-
surance of adequate protection. The Securities Act of 1933. requiring full
disclosure, was a great step forward in this respect on a national scale, but
statutory revision and progressive judicial thinking are still sorely needed at
the state level.
